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Introduction 
The institutional perspective sees the UK's economic decline in the twentieth century 
as rooted in the rigidities established at the end of the nineteenth. According to Elbau  m
and Lazonick, the competitive capitalism which had served Britain well in the earlier 
parts of the nineteenth century failed to transform itself into the corporate capitalism 
necessary for success by the century's end.1 From an institutional perspective the Lanca- 
shire cotton industry provides a classic example of this predicament. Its first basic 
weakness, argues Lazonick, lay in its industrial organization.2 The vertical specialization 
that characterized the industry - in particular, the split between cotton spinners and 
cotton weavers - meant that there did not exist the co-ordination of decision-making 
necessary to replace traditional methods of production with the new technologies of r  ing
spinning and automatic looms. This, it is argued, was a situation which persisted wel  l
into the twentieth century and which saw the industry unable in the end to withstand 
the pressures of foreign competition. 
This view of the nature and impact of the structure of organizations has more recently 
been called into question.3 Higgins and Toms, for example, have provided evidence 
which suggests that vertical specialization in the industry was associated with superior 
financial performance.4 Debate on this issue is likely to continue but it is not our intention 
here to be part of it. If we accept at least that the institutionalist perspective on the 
relationship between organization structure and competitive advantage is not beyond 
question, this places a greater emphasis on a second part of their case: the role of industrial 
relations in the long-term decline of the UK economy. 
For Lazonick, the cotton industry in the last quarter of the nineteenth and the first 
part of the twentieth century was one in which workers were well-organized and able to 
impose their demands on employers.5 In this account, trade unions were able to exploit 
the system of wage lists around which negotiations in the industry were structured. 
Employers did derive some benefits from this system - it offered a defence against both 
damaging price wars and workers' collectively reducing the pace of work - and were to 
some extent also able to circumvent it by the use of inferior cotton inputs or 'bad spinning'. 
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Nonetheless, just as in the case of industrial organization, the institutionalist argument 
is that even into the 1960s management was constrained in technological innovation by 
the system of industrial relations established at the end of the previous century. 
This part of the institutional case thus needs to be considered alongside those who 
see this system of industrial relations as being of central importance in the UK's more 
general technological backwardness. Prime amongst these are Kilpatrick and Lawson, 
who argue that the early acceptance of trade unionism in the UK meant that by the 
beginning of the twentieth century even 'new' unions of unskilled workers had followed 
the craft-based unions in establishing customs and norms which predated and thus resisted 
the introduction of mass production techniques.6 The policy of British management wa  s
to conciliate rather than challenge this power, the effect being to damage the economy's 
capacity for innovation and hence its potential for growth. 
These views have not of course gone unchallenged. For one thing, the Kilpatrick and 
Lawson thesis suffers from a lack of supporting evidence. They make reference to a 
number of industry case studies but on closer examination these appear to offer the  m
little support.7 Other authors have attacked the arguments themselves. Coates drew 
attention to the "employers' offensive" of the 1890s, and argues also that it is 'almost 
impossible' for any substantial workplace power possessed by trade unions to have survived 
in the widespread and persistent unemployment of the 1920S and 1930S.8 Hyman and 
Elger argue that Kilpatrick and Lawson's is an 'over-romanticized' view of British working 
class strength, one which ignores the limited nature of any gains it was able to make.9 
Dintenfass emphasizes how in many cases trade unions collaborated with management 
in such industries as engineering, cotton and coal.10 
The objective of the present paper is to add weight to those who take issue with the 
idea that it was employee strength and recalcitrance in the cotton industry that led to its 
failure to innovate and, in turn, to its long-term decline. To do this the paper divides 
into three main parts. The first of these examines the transformation in industrial relations 
in the half century before 1914. It evolved in this period from an individualistic, sometime  s
paternalistic environment in which Utopian inspired co-operative o ganizational structures r
briefly flourished, into a highly institutionalized, federated system. 
In the second main part of the paper we turn to the balance of power within this 
system of industrial relations. The evidence presented is drawn from accounting records, 
a source not commonly exploited in labour history. Such neglect would be surprising in 
any case, given the usefulness of this type evidence for assessing the outcomes of barg ining a
processes. It is particular surprising in the case of the cotton industry in this period, for  
it is precisely around issues of accounting information that the system of industrial 
relations was structured. 
Using similar accounts-based data, the third main part of the paper addresses the 
question of technological change more directly. The evidence presented here suggests 
that because employers were doing well out of the existing system they had little incentive 
to introduce new technologies. A full examination of the labour costs associated with 
the spinning process - taking into account the necessary attendant processes as well as 
the spinning itself - shows that the introduction of the new ring-spinning technologies 
was difficult to justify. In looking for an explanation of the Lancashire industry's tech- 
nological 'backwardness', we conclude, it is thu  at employer policy rather than employee s
resistance that our attention should be directed. 
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From Co-operative Organization to Industrial Relations 
The co-operative principle upon which many Lancashire business organizations had been 
founded since the i84os reinforced the subsequent development of 'working class 
limiteds'.11 Their rise and fall had important implications for the evolution of industrial 
relations in the cotton industry which are analysed in this section. 
The experience of the Rochdale 'pioneers' in distributive co-operatives encouraged 
similar ventures in the field of production. A prominent example, the Rochdale Co- 
operative Manufacturing Society, later known as the Mitchell Hey mill was established 
as a co-operative in 1854. All the promoters were members of the Society, and all 
employees were shareholders and surpluses were paid as a bonus to labour.12 Similar 
developments six years later led to the establishment of the Sun Mill Company, formed 
in 1859. Its founders, the members of the Oldham Industrial Co-operative Society, led 
by the idealistic William Marcroft, gave the new company a democratic structure designed 
to foster the principles of producer co-operation and employee control. Management of 
the company was by means of elected committees, for example along the lines of 
responsibility for different parts of the balance sheet, namely the 'Fixed Stock' and 
'Saleable Stock' committees.13 
Such democratic principles obviated the need for shopfloor trade union organization 
and must at least partly explain why Oldham District operatives shunned industry-wide 
trade unions in the 1850s and 1860s.14 Union organization remained problematic for 
several decades due to worker share ownership in the new 'democratic' limiteds. The 
limited liability principle, to which the co-operators also subscribed following the Com- 
panies Acts of 1856 and 1862, was seen as an adjunct of co-operation. Working class 
investment was thereby reinforced and following the notation of sixty new mills in the 
1873-5 period, the methods of organization, management and accounting were direct 
imitations of the co-operative societies.15 Thus in 1873 75% of shares in these mills were 
owned by working class investors, although this proportion declined towards the end of 
the decade. A couple of years later total investors in Oldham numbered 10,000, or one 
in five of the population.16 
Contradictions in co-operative principles meant that the prominent experiments were 
shortlived. Thus few workers owned shares in their own companies for long. When 
Gladstone visited Sun Mill in 1867 only 4 out of 1,000 shareholders were also employees 
and he observed '. . . this company is not really a co-operative one, but an association 
of small capitalists'.17 At Mitchell Hey, the co-operative principles also began to decline 
in the 1860s. As is common with many co-operative organizations, scale and industrial 
democracy acted in contradiction.18 A new group of working class shareholders created 
through a share issue for a second mill, objected to the payment of dividends to labour. 
As many worked at other mills, where they had no similar right to these bonuses, they 
were keen to end the practice. In 1862, after two previous unsuccessful votes, a majority 
succeeded in abolishing the labour bonus principle.19 Nonetheless, cotton operatives 
continued to be significant contributors to the share lists of other companies floated 
under the limited liability acts20 and these early associations had an important influence 
on the development of industrial relations in Lancashire. 
The 18 70s was a transitional decade in this respect, with two conflicting forces at 
work; the traditional institutional structures of co-operation and the adoption of wage 
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lists. Democratic governance structures were adopted which meant that characteristically 
there was wide public participation at company meetings, in new issues, and n the buying 
and selling of existing shares.21 Democratic structure was maintained via a ‘one member 
one vote' system at quarterly shareholders- meetings. Directors- salaries -re kept to a 
small fraction of those earned in other industries in companies owned by, as Potter put i  t,
‘upper classshareholders " Democratic norms were further underpinned by mechanism  s
such as limits on maximum shareholdings, proxy holdings and anonymous institutiona  l
or nominee investors," At the same time, the expertise and technical knowledge tome 
increasingly important for both worker/shareholders and operatives For the former 
participatory governance mechanisms provided the opportunity to apply shopfloor based 
scrutiny thought by some to contribute towards improved efficiency" For the latter, 
the emergence of the list system meant increasing reliance on union officials who were 
skilled technicians. Like 'the valuer or accountant- such experts took a highly professional 
For the overwhelming  majority of Oldham operatives, it was reliance on union officials 
rarher than participation in company management that became the modus operand,. The 
trade  cycle, 'is associated uncertainties and the redistributions of wealth, was the d ving ri
force The depression of 1877-9 discouraged working class equity investment as share 
values fell although the companies themselves survived.^ As union membership 
increased working class equity investment declined, the worker-shareholders 
with suspicion on the shop floor," Meanwhile, booms tended to be associated with the 
promotion of more secretive, narrowly controlled companies.28 Working class d illusionment is
with share ownership became complete in the 1800s which saw ‘unparalledled 
depression and of severity and duration." Between late 1890 and early 1895 an index 
of the Oldham stock market fell almost continuously for forty eight months, before 
finally reaching a pro war low in March 1896.'° Poorer investors were unable to mee  t
calls from the cash snapped limited companies and former share owning operatives 
turned increasingly to the security offered by trade union organization. 
The Balance of Power in Industrial Relations: Evidence from Outcomes 
The Brooklands Agreement 
The period 1870 to 1890 had witnessed several important trends These were a shift from 
North East to South East Lancashire as the main focus o developing trade union 
Organization 31, the adoption of wage lists, the decline of employer paternalism and the 
linked rise of employer federations, and the rise of federal bargaining structures. Increasingly 
tempestuous industrial relations culminated in the ‘Brooklands Lockout’, the 
subsequent agreement in 1893 and the institutionalisation of bargaining thereafter. An  
important; feature of the new system was its promotion of employer and operative 
collaroration to further collective interests, for example through political lobbying. 2 
The pattern of dispute and the agreements that ended them, were predicated on the 
vulnerability of the industry to the business cycle." Therefore the Employers’ Federation 
had a strong incentive to suggest that profits were lower than they really were34. 
while the operatives, and especially the Spinners, were wedded to an economic doctrine 
that suggested these profits fixed the maximum possible wage.35 Such a combination of 
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attitudes suggests, given the asymmetry of accounting information, the employers we 
in a better position to exploit the new bargaining structures and that despite their creation 
of a closed union labour aristocracy, the operative spinners representatives were in a poo  r
position to protect the wages of their members. In this section we explore this possibility 
through an analysis of winners and losers following the agreement. 
In response to Brooklands, employers increasingly centralized the indoor manager ent n
of their companies. As the problems of agreeing as to the 'state of trade' persisted into 
the i9oos,36 directors' coups eliminated the last vestiges of democratic ownership in the 
Oldham companies. From now on it was necessary to operate with greater secrecy towards 
the workforce.37 With centralization of capital ownership came growth in employer 
associations. Previously democratically controlled companies became the driving force 
first with the establishment of the centralized United Cotton Spinners Association an 
later the Federation of Master Cotton Spinners Associations.38 
As the demands of workers and employers became increasingly channelled into formal 
ized bargaining structures, it is interesting to speculate as to which side tended to benefit 
the more. The evidence suggests that despite increasing solidarity expressed through s op h
floor organization, the employers benefited more from the Brooklands compromise. A 
the agreement institutionalized piece rates, wages remained linked to the efficiency c 
the industry and were also variable depending on the stage of the trade cycle. 
Trends in Real Wages 
These reasons partly explain why at a time when cotton profits were better than in the 
rest of the economy, particularly in the period 1896-1914, Lancashire cotton operat e iv
achieved smaller increases in real wages than did workers in other sectors.39 Table 
shows that as profits for British industry as a whole declined, the cotton sector experienced 
a rising trend. Unlike other sectors by and large, especially in its dramatic climax o 
1907, returns were quite spectacular 40 and must have had a profound influence on the 
cotton investor. Whereas cotton investors were rewarded by far better returns after 1896 
the picture for employees was more ambivalent. As for the rest of the economy, the 
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affected as much by the spread of general unionism as it was by the retention of craft 
control,42 whereas the general economy included a growing class of professional and 
salaried workers hitherto unrecognized in the construction of real wages indices.43 Al- 
though the breaks in trend occurred for both cotton and manufacturing around 1900, 
cotton had been lagging behind for about a decade. We have commented elsewhere that 
cotton suffered badly in the depression of the early i89os, and it is evident from figure 
1 that contemporaries were incorrect to blame the trade unions for the plight of the' 
industry and the crash in share values,44 as relative wages were falling, albeit perhaps 
not as steeply as the employers would have liked. 
If the Brooklands agreement had stabilized industrial relations,45 it did so at the expense 
of the stability of wages themselves. By implicitly linking wage advances and reductions 
to the trade cycle, but at the same time limiting them to one per year and to a maximum 
of five per cent,46 the agreement helped ensure chat wages fluctuated, but with nothing 
like the variation in profits. Thus cotton wages raced ahead in the boom of 1904-7 relative 
to other groups, but then fell dramatically again in the slump of 1909-10. However, in 
relation to generally improving profits, the share of extra wealth accruing to labour as  w
' low, and adjusted only slowly so chat the benefit of the 5 advance of June 1907 was 
shortlived and by July 1908 the employers were already pushing for a reduction.47 Suppo t r
for trade federations and collective action on wages must have contributed towards higher 
profits for the rising class of cotton financial capitalists, and probably outweighed the 
benefits of previously paternalistic management style.48 In so far that this was a deliberate 
and forced response to an apparent increase in the bargaining power of the operative -  
s,49 the Brooklands agreement would appear to have been an effective managemen  t
response for the maintenance of profitability. The 'company town' and paternalistic 
management styles were declining in this period, 50 and the attractiveness of the new 
bargaining system and its associated employer solidarity may have accentuated the process. 
For cotton workers, craft unionism and its industry wide accommodation with employers' 
federations at Brooklands, thus appeared to offer little benefit. The Leninist argument of 
'embourgoisification',51 the rising wealth of the working class creating a mood for the 
acceptance of reformist ideas, did not apply in the strict sense. Election of reformist trade 
union officials before 1890, according to one view, was the result of narrowing margins 
after 1873 and the need felt by employers for an industrial detente.52 Mutual interest 
' policies culminated in the compromise at Brooklands when Macara and Mawdsley, 
representing the two sides, struck up a lasting friendship, and an agreement which, 'pointed 
the way ... to that industrial harmony which arises from wise statesmanship and eschews 
the weapon of force'.53 
:         However, the union leaders' policies of employer collaboration subsequently created 
conditions which led a relative fall in real wages for cotton operatives in the i90os at a 
time of rising profits for the employers. Even so, as the conditions which had led to the 
rise of collaboration went into reverse, there was no return to increased militancy. From 
!       1893 the characteristic mood was of 'industrial peace';54 even the boom of 1907 failed 
I       to produce strikes associated with wage demands, and signs of growing disaffection were 
I       only apparent in the very last years before the 1914-8 war.55 Overall it is difficult to 
i       conclude that the system of industrial relations acted as a barrier to cost cutting employer 
strategies.56 The Brooklands system provided the employers with a satisfactory mechanism 
|       for keeping wages under control. 
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Industrial Relations and Technical Change 
Our analysis so far suggests that it is unlikely that it was trade union strength that 
accounted for British firms' reluctance to adopt the new production technologies. 
Having also cast doubt on the idea that vertical specialization in the industry was the 
key factor, we turn now to a more direct consideration of firms' decisions in this area. 
According to the Lazonick hypothesis, saving on raw material input was an impo tant r
reason for adherence to the mule. Trade union inflexibility and the minder-piecer 
system prevented the reorganization of work to achieve labour cost savings; at the sa e m
time the system was threatened by the availability of ring spinning. Masters and me  n
therefore co-operated to achieve the best productivity possible through raw material 
savings, for example in the agreement for bad spinning compensation in the Brooklands 
agreement of 1893. 69 
Whilst providing a plausible theory, this argument is not backed by evidence from 
Rochdale, the early centre of British ring spinning. It is noteworthy first of all that tho  se
making the experimental moves in ring spinning did not cite labour cost as a source o  f
saving. Rather, the Rochdale entrepreneurs justified their investment in rings in terms 
of savings in raw material input without any loss of quality, low breakdown and main- 
tenance cost, and the relative cheapness of the machinery.70 In Rochdale, and elsewhere, 
raw material saving was given as a key reason for the introduction of the ring. Had 
Lancashire entrepreneurs wished compete against the threat of low wage competition 
from overseas on the basis of savings in raw material input, the ring spindle would have 
given them the means of doing so for the lower range of counts. 
On the other hand, using the ring spindle did not provide the early ring spinning 
companies with an easy way round the increased institutionalization of industrial relations. 
Their entrepreneurs relied on paternalism rather than exploitation, but at the same tim  e
sought solidarity with employers elsewhere in the industry. Such contradictions were 
keenly felt throughout Lancashire, especially where joint stock companies were preval- 
ent.71 As elsewhere, Milnrow, the location of the earliest ring spinning companies, had  
many of the characteristics of a 'company town'. Like the Ashtons of Hyde and the 
Fieldens of Todmorden, the Heaps of Milnrow exercised a good deal of local deferential 
and political influence, as manifested in the local reaction to the death of the foundin  g
' entrepreneur.72 Yet only a few days earlier the hands employed at his New Ladyhouse, 
' the New Hey and the Haugh spinning mills had been placed on a week's notice. Local 
management acted at the behest of the Masters' Federation, which had decided to stop 
the mills until the settlement of the Stalybridge dispute. In addition to the Milnrow ring 
spinners, mule spinning mills such as the nearby Garfield were also involved.73 Wh tever a
reason Heap and Tweedale had for promoting the ring spindle at Milnrow, it was not 
because they sought to drive down wages, nor was it to escape from the increasingly 
institutionalized structure of labour relations. 
In order to gain further insight, and to reassess the apparent contradictions arising 
from the above discussion in further detail, it is useful to compare actual cost structures 
of ring and mule companies. Ring and mule labour cost statistics for the late i88o  s
and early i89os, based on the Milrow companies and other mule and ring mills in 
nearby Oldham, show that the labour content of their output was actually higher in the 
188os and i89os than for mule spindles.74 Unlike the paternalist managements of 
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the Milnrow mills, potential emulators may not have had a generous attitude towards 
expensive, and perhaps locally scarce, ring spinning labour. Comparative data, in term  s
of spindles per hand also suggests the early ring spinners had a greater labour intensity 
than mule spindle concerns. The higher productivity of ring spindles meant that labour 
formed an approximately equal proportion of total cost. Expensive labour in the context 
of ring spinning directly contradicts the usual understanding of the development of this 
technology. 
Labour cost savings, given the faster speed of the ring spindle, may have been availab  le
in the spinning process itself. However, ring spinning required more labour in roving and 
other preparation stages and in subsequent processes, such as doffing and winding.75 Wh re e
ring spinning developed from throstle spinning, as in Rochdale and other areas, there was 
a tradition of labour intensity, particularly with regard to doffing.76 Doffing was an unskilled 
task and was usually carried out by teams (four per machine) of young and inexperienced 
workers.77 It was their employment that to the apparent labour intensity of ring spinning. 
Evidence from the Rochdale district can be corroborated by international comparisons. 
A ring spinning mill in France in 1882 producing 3os twist had a spindle per operative 
ratio of 75,  78 and was thus directly comparable in labour intensity with the New Ladyhouse 
spinning company at 79, but well below the level of 206 achieved by the typical Oldham 
mule spinner. 
That labour cost saving was not a strategy associated with the introduction of ring 
spinning was confirmed by contrasts of costs between the ring mills themselves. The 
New Ladyhouse mill was the most profitable of the three Milnrow concerns, yet it was 
also the most labour intensive.79 Profits may have been improved by the relatively low 
average wage, which in turn may have reflected the application of piece rates to at least 
some of the hands. Even so, workers were paid more here on average than in the 
strongholds of labour aristocracy in the mule mills of Oldham. James Heap would have 
been regarded as a generous employer and the public grief apparently expressed by the 
whole town on his death may have run deeper, and for reasons beyond those of pure 
paternalism, than guessed at by the newspaper correspondent.80 Expensive labour cost 
may have been compounded by the absence of a comprehensive, institutionalized wage 
list coupled with the relative scarcity of ring spinners. Highly individual lists for ri g n
i       spinners existed by the early i90os. Following industrial action, the final moves towards 
a universal official list for ring spinners' wages were not made until 1912.81 Moreover, 
the same factor may have led to variation in wages over time and by geographical area. 
Thus, although wage structures were important, as far as the early experiments in 
ring spinning were concerned, they were not decisive. The new ring mills might well 
have employed female labour and probably young girls to doff the machines; they wer  e
hardly sweatshops though, and labour cost savings were patently not the reason for the 
introduction of ring spinning. 
Relative expense of ring mill labour may also have been a product of cheap labour in 
the mule spinning section of the industry. As an oft quoted example of a labour aristo at,82 cr
relatively high wages in the mule room were confined to the senior minder. Out of his 
own wage, he would effectively sub-contract his two assistants, the big piecer and little 
piecer, both of whom depended on promotion up this hierarchy.83 Both earned relatively 
low wages,84 and would have depressed the average wage per hand. Thus expensive and 
cheap labour existed side by side. Whereas the subcontracted payment system might create 
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cotton input, without having to increase their prices. Bearing the above interpretative 
difficulties in mind, the superiority of the ring on raw material usage clearly made a net 
contribution to company profits. 
Another factor influencing cost structure was lack of industry concentration, and the 
very small market share of each firm. Under such circumstances high levels of fixed cost 
create disproportionately large losses as output falls in a recession. Increasing the scale 
of operations would accentuate such risks. There was thus a strong incentive to avoid 
ring spinning where, despite some tentative evidence for the use of piece rates at Milnrow, 
time based wage rates predominated. By contrast mule spinning was attractive, since 
labour was paid according to piece rates and the Brooklands agreement specifically allowed 
wage rates to vary with the trade cycle.90 Fixed cost was also avoided through vertic l a
specialization, allowing management and administrative costs to remain minimal, the 
market acting as the co-ordinating mechanism.91 Lazonick has argued that investment 
in rings was more likely to occur in integrated firms developing high throughput pro- 
duction.92 However, under the highly variable demand conditions imposed by the trade 
cycle, the last thing entrepreneurs needed was the high fixed cost structure that such 
investment implied. 
Previous discussions of the relative merits of ring spinning which have used labour 
cost in their analysis have thus concentrated too narrowly on the spinning process itself. 
Under British conditions, if wage cost was a barrier to competitiveness, labour intensity 
in preparatory and after spinning processes must have been an important reason for the 
coexistence of the ring and mule for a further generation. In its early years at least, ring 
spinning was not a route for substitution of labour by capital. 
Conclusions 
The evidence presented in this paper allows us to consider afresh the issues raised in the 
introduction. Our first conclusion concerns the state of industrial relations and its impact 
on the diffusion of new technologies. Union inability to defend real wages and seek major 
advances in buoyant trading conditions, and where there were increases in labour 
productivity, may mean that trade unions were weaker than hitherto recognized, that 
the Brooklands agreement was generally favourable to the employers, and that unions 
would not have been able to mount any serious challenge to a determined employers' 
bid to replace mules and power looms with alternative technologies. For industrial 
relations, this was the opposite to what happened in the period 1867 to 1885, when 
there was a shift from capital to labour.93 According to one view, this put pressure on 
employers and forced them into industry wide bargaining at Brooklands.94 It would be 
difficult to blame unions for failure to make investments in alternative technology since 
their power to resist was low. 
Our second conclusion reinforces the first. Looking at the costs associated with the 
different technologies, the evidence shows that as ring spinning was actually more labour 
intensive than mule spinning, it could not have had any great appeal to employers 
seeking to displace labour or circumvent the increasing institionalization of wage nego- 
tiations. Commercially, the superior profits enjoyed by the Milnrow companies resulted 
from savings on raw material inputs, an advantage that would have been shared by other 
ring spinning companies. If we are trying to explain why the Lancashire cotton industry 
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appeared slow to adopt the new technologies available to it, it is on the decisions of 
employers rather than the recalcitrance of employees that our attention should focus. 
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